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Chorus: Here let us stand, close by the cathedral.  Here 
let us wait. Are we drawn by danger?  Is it the 
knowledge of safety, that draws our feet towards the 
cathedral? What danger can be for us, the poor, the 
poor women of Canterbury?  What tribulation with 
which we are not already familiar?  There is no danger 
for us, and there is no safety in the cathedral.  Some 
presage of an act which our eyes are compelled to 
witness, has forced our feet towards the cathedral.  We 
are forced to bear witness.1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This article examines the twelfth century controversy between 
Henry II and Archbishop Thomas Becket.  Although the struggle 
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between these two individuals occurred during the distant centuries 
in medieval England, the ramifications of their conflict remains with 
us today, both spiritually and legally.  It is for this reason that we 
explore this topic again.  
 
II. CANON LAW 
 
Before the Norman Conquest, the Catholic Church’s influence 
was not widespread in England.2  As a result, there existed in England 
a singular tribunal consisting of both the bishop and the Earl whose 
responsibility it was to determine all controversies of legal 
significance, both lay and ecclesiastical.3  Accordingly, no distinct 
separation existed between church courts and secular courts prior to 
the Conquest.4  Not only were the two courts closely linked, but 
initially, the mood of the ecclesiastical courts and royal courts 
generally was one of compromise and reconciliation.5  Over time, 
however, the legal disputes between lay and ecclesiastical members of 
the two competing establishments would become increasingly 
contentious.  This, in turn, lead William the Conqueror to carry out 
the promise he had made prior to his conquest of England – to set up 
separate ecclesiastical courts in England in exchange for the Pope’s 
blessing of his ideological campaign.6  In doing so, he removed suits 
“which belong to the government of souls” from lay tribunals to 
ecclesiastical tribunals, thereby permitting the legal separation of the 
two courts.7  It was through this division that William, perhaps 
unintentionally, set in motion the struggle between church and state 
courts that would last well beyond his reign.8  William’s approach 
disrupted the traditional cooperative atmosphere that had previously 
existed between bishops and laypeople.9  Before William’s reign, 
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ecclesiastical judges could participate in the adjudicatory procedures 
of state courts, and bring actions of an ecclesiastical nature before the 
secular courts to be decided according to temporal laws.10  After the 
division of power, however, they could do neither of these things. 
By necessity, the dispensation of justice would thereafter be 
determined by two types of courts – ecclesiastical and secular (lay) 
jurisdictions.11  Not surprisingly, church courts did not implement 
English customary law in administering justice within their own 
tribunals; rather, these new ecclesiastical courts applied the medieval 
canon law of the Catholic Church.12  Because these canon precedents 
were strongly based on Roman Law, they were by this time a well-
established body of developed law, especially in the areas of crime 
and criminal procedure.13  For this reason, church courts claimed the 
authority to preside over a wide range of legal issues. 
To illustrate, the English church courts dealt not only with 
crimes and public offenses against morality, but also with secular 
matters.14  Ecclesiastical courts claimed broad authority to regulate 
virtually every aspect of daily life of lay society, both among the 
clergy and the laity.15  They believed they were endowed not only 
with the legal right but also the moral duty to subvert all religious or 
moral ideas that deviated from traditional orthodox Christian 
norms.16  Unorthodox views, they believed, threatened not only the 
salvation of the individual, but also threatened to infect society in 
general.17  As one commentator summarily stated, “[i]t would have 
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been difficult, indeed almost impossible, for an individual, regardless 
of social status or occupation, to remain untouched from one year’s 
end to the next by the canonical regulations.”18  It was on this basis 
that church authorities claimed the right to regulate all commercial 
and non-commercial activity, matters of a sexual nature, legitimacy 
issues, labor concerns, testamentary succession, matters relating to the 
poor and disadvantaged, and the burial of the dead.19  Throughout 
this period the church courts endeavored to make their legal system 
conform as much as possible to the ideal of Christian conduct, and to 
lessen the gap between law and moral conduct.20 
Similarly, ecclesiastical courts claimed the right to prosecute 
and, if necessary, excommunicate those individuals whose views 
offended the church’s values.21  The most frequently tried issues in 
church courts were those of a criminal nature,22 for church authorities 
had to try all crimes committed by clerics (or clerks) of whatever 
description.23  Thus, anyone who enjoyed the privileges of clerical 
status – monks, hermits, nuns, and the like – were subject to the 
jurisdiction of the church.24  It is important to note, however, while 
the church may have cast a wide net insofar as its claim of authority 
to resolve legal actions among clergy and laypersons alike, its 
assertions were at all times subject to the power granted the church 
courts by the English crown.25  For this reason, conflicts would soon 
arise between the church and crown with respect to their courts’ 
perceived interests and responsibilities. 
First, the needs and demands of an individual claimant would 
often-times determine, or at least encourage, which court the claimant 
would petition for relief.26  In other words, whether a claim was 
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brought or heard in courts of church or crown often depended upon 
the relief sought.27  For instance, canon law favored the flexible 
disposition of property by testament, while English customary law 
preferred conveyances in accordance with established rules.28  A by-
product of this consumer choice (or “forum shopping” as it is known 
today) was that each of the courts would feverishly work to safeguard 
their own jurisdictions from the encroachment by the other, while at 
the same time seek to draw as many claimants to their own tribunals 
as possible.29 
A second factor contributing to this dissension concerned the 
uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding particular pleas or else the 
complex legal issues presented for review in any particular case, 
which, depending on the how the claim was viewed by any particular 
court and what method of proof would be used in the case might 
determine how the issue was decided.30  One source of tension 
concerned the large number of disputes about land between bishops 
and laypeople.  Again, the question concerned what method of proof 
would be used to determine the controversy.31  While trial by battle 
was unacceptable to the church, documentary evidence or witness 
testimony was unacceptable to the king.32  Generally speaking, such 
disputes were generated by both laymen and clergy, who were 
attempting to exploit jurisdictional rivalries for personal wealth or 
advantage.33  Individual claimants were pleading their case to 
whatever court could resolve them, regardless of the pretensions of 
either jurisdiction.34 
A third complicating factor was that the crown courts came to 
resent the sweeping jurisdictional claims of the ecclesiastical courts 
and, more importantly, claimed the authority to define the boundaries 
of the church’s jurisdiction – a claim that church authorities strongly 
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contested.35  Superior power rested with the crown, which, if 
necessary, could halt any procedures of the Christian courts which 
infringed or threatened to infringe upon the authority of the crown, 
and could similarly punish those ecclesiastical judges who disobeyed 
the crown’s commands.36  It is not difficult to understand that the two 
legal systems could not co-exist once their shared goals continued to 
erode and the distrust between the crown and church became more 
and more apparent.37  The controversy between King Henry II and 
Archbishop Thomas Becket brings to bear the intensity of this conflict.  
III. THE BECKET AFFAIR 
 
In 1154, Henry II’s reign as King of England began.  Henry, 
like many rulers before him, believed the Catholic Church in general 
and the Pope in particular had too much authority in England.38  
“Accordingly, Henry sought to assert his own position of power by 
decreasing the power of the English bishops in whom the Pope’s 
authority was vested.”39  In furtherance of this goal, he appointed his 
friend and colleague, Thomas Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury.40  
However, Becket’s views were not completely aligned with those of 
Henry.41  Becket advocated “clerical immunity” – a system in which 
the church, relying upon the canon law principle that clerks had to be 
tried in church courts, permitted its holy order to escape the authority 
of the royal courts in cases of alleged wrongdoing.42  The right of the 
church courts, Becket believed, was central to the authority of the 
Church, and he insisted on enforcing its prerogatives.43 
“Henry, however, believed ‘criminous’ clerks, like other 
criminals, should be brought before the King’s court.”44  Henry’s 
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principle concern was that the doctrine of clerical immunity was 
being abused by many of his ecclesiastical subjects, in the desire to 
circumvent the authority of the crown’s courts and seek relief under 
the more hospitable ecclesiastical courts.45  To be sure, many royal 
subjects assumed the role of “clerks” as a means of saving themselves 
from prosecution under the crown.46 
In response, Henry published the Constitutions of Clarendon 
in 1164, which was designed to expand the power of the crown at the 
expense of church courts and to end what he believed to be 
jurisdictional overreaching by church authorities.47  Henry published 
sixteen Constitutions in all.48  Not surprisingly, Henry’s actions 
brought an immediate response from the Pope, who promptly 
denounced “ten of the Constitutions, four of which concerned the 
jurisdiction of church courts.”49  More important for our purposes, 
however, was the controversy that erupted between Becket and 
Henry II with respect to the Constitutions. 
Becket was concerned that the jurisdictional reforms set up by 
Henry provided the possibility of double punishment (now known as 
the concept of “double jeopardy”), as Henry’s plan permitted the 
prosecution of crimes in both the ecclesiastical and King’s courts.50  
Becket, however, believed that when a person may be tried by either 
court and has been tried by one, it was intolerable that he should be 
tried again for the same crime.51  Becket insisted there should be but 
one trial, and naturally, that any such trial should be before the 
ecclesiastical courts since clerics were exempt from secular criminal 
process by virtue of their religious standing.52  Becket perceived 
Henry’s authority as an unlawful concentration of power in the crown 
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and as an assault upon the liberty of the Church – a stance that would 
make him a martyr for his cause.53 
Conversely, Henry insisted upon the supremacy of the crown, 
at least in matters of lay relations.54  This matter of jurisdiction was 
the core of the conflict between these two old friends.55  And it was for 
this right that Becket struggled to preserve the liberty and authority of 
the church, and it was for this cause that he would ultimately lose his 
life also, surprisingly enough, at the hands (at least indirectly) of his 
old friend.56  At the height of their controversy, Becket was murdered 
by four loyal subjects of Henry II who, perhaps mistakenly, perceived 
Henry’s ill-fated remark “Who will free me from this turbulent 
priest?” as a directive from Henry to kill Becket.57  Under the auspices 
of this royal “mandate,” four of Henry’s knights took it upon 
themselves to assassinate Becket on the floor of the Canterbury 
Cathedral in 1170.58 
The public outrage surrounding Becket’s assassination forced 
Henry II to repent and submit to the authority of the Pope for his role 
in Becket’s death.59  But more than anything else, he did this for the 
sake of restoring unity in England.60  After Becket’s death, Henry was 
forced to limit the state’s power over ecclesiastical courts – limits that 
survive today throughout the West.61  Indeed, the principle of 
separation of church and state entered the formal canon law soon 
after Becket’s death, declaring void any statute that contravened 
ecclesiastical liberty.62  These limits were instrumental in creating a 
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balance between the state and the individual by curtailing the 
absolute power of the state to regulate all matters. 
Upon reflection, Henry’s actions can be explained as a 
campaign to displace the power of the Church in the temporal and 
spiritual affairs of England and to establish one rule of law in all of 
England.63  Becket, on the other hand, “attempted to establish that 
human law was in the shadow of divine law, appealing to a law 
greater than the law articulated by Henry II.”64  Despite the 
unfortunate circumstances surrounding the Becket affair, it is fair to 
say that the struggle contributed greatly to the development of a body 
of law that remains with us to this day. 
Through his efforts to limit the ecclesiastical jurisdiction and 
his powerful royal in the administration of justice, Henry II developed 
a body of law suited for the needs of England at the time, and it is 
through the rise of the system of courts laid down in the century to 
follow Henry II that served as the foundation of the common law.65  
Similarly, it was Thomas Becket’s adherence to the equitable 
principles of canon law that was primarily responsible for bringing 
about the adoption of the concept of double jeopardy in the common 
law. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
As we have seen, the jurisdictional struggle between the courts 
in twelfth century England generally, and the rivalry between Henry 
II and Becket specifically, reflected the political controversy and 
power struggles of the era.  The secularization of equity was an 
arduous and deadly process.  On a larger scale, however, the Becket 
affair provides the bedrock upon which our common law and modern 
notions of legal equity rest.  And while contemporary courts may 
have obviated the need for ecclesiastical courts inasmuch as modern 
judges now resort to the use of equitable remedies as a means of 
achieving a just and fair result in our courts, the origins of such 
equitable relief properly lye in medieval England. 
                                                          
63 Moser, supra note 4, at 522. 
64 Smith & Montrose, supra note 60, at 515 n. 491. 
65 POUND, supra note 2, at 42. 
